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Abstract This paper proposes two interrelated argu-
ments: first, it is argued that agro-commodity traders are
uniquely placed at the crossroads of agricultural trade to
benefit from agricultural commodity speculation; and sec-
ond, that the networks constituting their operations are
central to their hedging activities. The case of Cargill—the
largest privately owned company in the United States and
one of the largest agricultural traders in the world—is used
to support this argument by unpacking its operations,
structure, and hedging strategies. In order to connect the
operations of Cargill to its speculating strategies, this paper
first traces how agriculture and finance have become
increasingly intertwined leading to heightened agricultural
commodity speculation. Second, Cargill will be positioned
within this process by analyzing how it has financialized its
own strategies and its Corporate Platform. Third, Black
River Asset Management, Cargill’s private equity arm, will
be analyzed to show how it uses the information moving
through Cargill’s Platform to engage in hedging and/or
speculation.
Keywords Speculation  Food crisis  Financialization 
Global food system  Cargill
Introduction
Between the years 2006 and 2008 commodity prices were
characterized by volatility and unpredictability. Yet, as
food prices rose and fell, some agricultural and financial
actors saw record high profits and increased power over the
global agricultural system. These included the ‘‘Four
Giants’’ of agribusiness, also collectively known as the
ABCD grain traders—that is, Archer Daniels Midland
(ADM), Bunge, Cargill, and Dreyfus. This paper argues
that this growth may be opportunistic and the result of
access to important information regarding the global sup-
ply of agricultural products. As Meyer in the Financial
Times, noted, ‘‘[p]hysical traders are often the first to know
when crops are falling short or energy cargoes are inter-
rupted, giving them the edge over others’’ (2011); implying
traders are using inside access to information through their
operations to take speculative positions in commodity
markets (van Dijk et al. 2011). This paper builds on this
argument and shows how commodity traders maintain
access to important information and the possible implica-
tions for agro-commodity markets.
Cargill is the largest of the ABCD traders and is nearly
twice the size of its publicly held rival in the food pro-
duction industry, ADM (Whitford and Burke 2011). In
2008, when food prices peaked, Cargill reported peak
earnings of $744 million (Cargill 2008). Cargill itself has
been open about its profits throughout the price swings. As
Cargill explained in an annual report from 2009: ‘‘the
insights gathered from many activities and places enabled
our trading teams to avoid being stung by plummeting
commodity prices’’ (Cargill 2009). It is argued here that
Cargill does so through an information network supported
by its Corporate Platform. This Platform is composed of
seven main business units divided further into subunits
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(70 in total), each with access to various agricultural actors,
companies, sectors, and privileged information regarding
current and future supply, demand, and risk. Three of
Cargill’s 70 subsidiaries—Black River Asset Management,
Cargill Risk Management, and Carval Investors—are
involved primarily in finance investing in agricultural
companies, funds, lands, and commodities. The sub-
sidiaries have allowed Cargill to capitalize on the finan-
cialization of agriculture via financial investment in
agricultural commodities, companies, and land (Salerno
2014). The financialization of agriculture refers to ‘‘the
increased influence of finance capital on the agri-food
system’’ which ‘‘not only provides new opportunities for
profit-making by hedge funds and private equity consortia,
but also creates a situation in which agrifood companies,
including food manufacturers, international commodity
traders and supermarkets, may benefit’’ (Burch and Lawr-
ence 2009, p. 267).
Speculation in food commodity markets has come under
fire recently with some scholars and activists claiming that
it encourages food price swings (see Kerckhoffs et al.
2010). One side of the debate—taken by academics,
economists, civil society, government departments, and
development organizations—asserts that financial specu-
lation is the underlying problem as financial actors
swarmed agricultural markets driving up prices (see Ker-
ckhoffs et al. 2010). Another stance—taken by financial
actors, economists, and some large development organi-
zations (such as the World Bank)—is that it is an issue of
supply and demand. In short, increasing population and
changing eating patterns, climate change, as well as various
global geopolitical dynamics, has meant supply has not
been able to meet demand and prices have moved
accordingly (see Irwin et al. 2009). A third position is that
it is a combination of both the implications of speculation
as well as the various elements affecting the supply and
demand of different commodities (such as transportation
costs, gas prices, storage costs, government policies, etc.)
(See De Schutter 2010). Cargill’s position in the debate lies
somewhere in the middle; employees have both claimed
that volatility is the result of non-agricultural actors
swarming financial markets, such as pension funds, equity
funds, and sovereign wealth funds (Luyt 2013), while also
arguing that ‘‘[t]here has to be the speculators in the mar-
ket…You cannot accuse speculators all the time, saying
that they are causing all this mess. You need those spec-
ulators…you need those guys to give the liquidity to the
market…you need the funds, you need the pension funds,
you need the speculators’’ (Cargill employee quoted in
Lander 2016). The above debate, while important for
context, will not be elaborated upon here (see De Schutter
2010 for further discussion). Rather than contributing to
this debate, this paper will analyze how agricultural
speculation can be used by agro-commodity traders
opportunistically with the case of Cargill.
This paper analyzes how Cargill benefits from agricul-
tural price volatility using the Platform’s networks, which
act as conduits for information transmission from the farm
gate to the market. van Dijk et al. (2011) describe how the
sharing of agricultural supply information is based on a
pivotal position in agricultural markets and can be used to
‘‘manipulate the market and profit from uncertainty’’.
Isakson (2014) has likewise argued that much of the large
traders’ recent profits is connected to ‘‘their unique access
to food suppliers’’ and ‘‘is also the source of information
regarding global food stocks, giving them an advantage
when hedging and speculating on price movements’’.
Clapp (2014) furthers this argument with reference to all of
the large agro-commodity traders:
The ABCD firms operate under a complex business
model that involves dealing in bulk commodities and
trading high volumes at typically low margins. Each
of these firms is intimately linked to the world of
complex agricultural commodity chains, with differ-
ent aspects of their business touching all aspects of
those chains from production to consumption. And
each has privileged access to information that has
helped them to maintain advantage over their com-
petitors (p. 804).
Building on these arguments, this paper demonstrates how
Cargill can profit from uncertainty through its highly
advanced information sharing system that encourages
Cargill employees and suppliers to share pivotal ‘‘on the
ground’’ information throughout its networks. The case of
their private equity fund, Black River, is analyzed to show
how information on the ground links up with financial
subsidiaries speculating and hedging in agricultural mar-
kets. This paper, therefore, focuses on the role of agro-
commodity traders engaging in agricultural commodity
speculation rather than primarily financial actors. This is
important since the involvement of agricultural actors
depicts how the structure of commodity markets empowers
them to speculate more efficiently than financial actors.
Cargill for example, one of the largest agro-commodity
traders in the world, is uniquely positioned to make use of
the information shared through its networks to speculate in
financial markets. Financial actors, on the other hand, do
not have direct access to this information, giving traders an
edge in speculative activities. Perhaps most importantly,
and most advantageous for Cargill, is the fact that this
information sharing, which some have characterized as
‘‘insider trading’’ (see Murphy et al. 2012, p. 27), is legal
and unregulated due to the structure of commodity markets.
In order to connect the operations of Cargill to its
hedging or speculating strategies, this paper first traces how
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agriculture and finance have become increasingly inter-
twined leading to heightened agricultural commodity
speculation. Second, Cargill will be positioned within this
process by analyzing how it has financialized its own
strategies. Third, Black River Asset Management, Cargill’s
private equity arm, will be analyzed to show how the
company’s subsidiaries feed information to its financial
offices to inform hedging strategies and possibly specula-
tive practices. Information is derived from fieldwork over a
12 month period in the Philippines, Singapore, and
Indonesia amongst investors, government officials,
national/local elites, land holders, business cliques, busi-
ness organizations, and others. Details are derived from
interviews and correspondence with Cargill employees,
and secondary information regarding Cargill’s operations.
The financialization of agriculture and speculation
in agricultural markets
The financialization of agriculture is a relatively recent
phenomenon that has emerged through various waves of
deregulation. Starting in the 18th century, futures exchanges
for agricultural commodities were established in London to
allow farmers and grain traders to buy and sell commodities
for a future delivery (Clapp 2014). This provided a form of
riskmanagement in a sector vulnerable to shifts in supply and
demand, for example due to weather fluctuations. Future
exchanges spread to various countries and trading in agri-
culture futures became common (Cronon 1991). Some of the
exchanges, such as theChicagoMercantile ExchangeGroup,
have been regulated since the 1900s in order to control the
possible manipulation of markets by taking large positions
(Clapp 2014). This is what is now termed ‘‘market specula-
tion’’, and will be discussed below.
Regulations were also used to monitor the uses of futures
contracts. For example, the US Commodity Exchange Act,
implemented in 1936, was implemented to manage specu-
lation by non-commercial traders by controlling the amount
of futures contracts they were allowed to hold at one time
(Clapp 2014). The objective was to control sudden price
shifts by preventing excessive speculation from non-com-
mercial traders (Clapp and Helleiner 2012). In 1974 the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) was
established as an important tool to regulate futures markets,
such as through position limits, in the US (Clapp 2014).
The regulations used to prevent market manipulation
were slowly eroded from the 1980s onwards, making the
connection between finance and agricultural products more
complex and enabling different players to invest in agricul-
tural commodities. In 2000 the Commodity Futures Mod-
ernization Act (CFMA) was implemented in the US, which
allowed over the counter (OTC) derivative trading and
speculation to occur more freely. Banks developed Com-
modity Index Funds (CIFs); which is a fund made up of
various commodities, including oil products, livestock,
minerals, etc. (Clapp 2014). In the current system, agricul-
tural commodities make up about 1/3 of all CIFs (ibid). CIFs
allow banks to trade the financial derivative of a product to
investors informally over the counter (Russi 2013) without
ever trading in the actual physical commodity.
In short, the recent financialization of agricultural
commodities coincides with the widespread deregulation of
markets. As Isakson (2014) explains, ‘‘[i]nfluenced by the
rise of neo-classical economics, particularly Milton Fried-
man’s ‘efficient markets hypothesis’, states erected a ‘New
Financial Architecture’ (NFA) that reflected the era’s pre-
vailing belief that minimal government regulation enables
markets to generate efficient and socially optimal out-
comes’’ (p. 4). The new approach to markets was based on
‘‘light regulation of commercial banks, and even lighter
regulation of investment banks, and little if any regulation
of the ‘shadow banking system’—hedge and private equity
funds and bank-centered Special Investment Vehicals’’
(Crotty 2009, p. 564). This meant that previously regulated
financial actors or traditional agricultural players were
enabled to consolidate large pools of investment funds,
financial techinicians could develop new financial prod-
ucts, and new investment areas were able to be identitified
(i.e. in land, agricultural derivatives, and agro-food enter-
prises) (Isakson 2014). Therefore, as the regulations that
previously controlled agricultural markets were weakened,
the nature of speculation in these markets changed as well.
Consequently, as commodity markets were deregulated,
financial investments in agricultural land and companies
also became common (Burch and Lawrence 2009). With
the financialization of the world economy, financial insti-
tutions opened up funds to invest in various sectors. These
funds were pooled to include the capital of different
financial institutions (such as pension funds). The funds
and financial branches that grew from the financialization
of commodity markets looked towards other areas of
investment, such as investing equity in agricultural com-
panies, land, and output. At the same time, as agriculture
became financialized, traditional agro-commodity traders
opened up their own funds and financial firms which would
allow them to engage in speculation. Traditional agricul-
tural players—such as traders, producers, retailers, etc.—
financialized their strategies to keep their operations rele-
vant and to expand financially within this context. Murphy
et al. (2012) explain this further:
Traditionally, the food system involved producers
(farmers) and a series of commercial interlocutors,
who traded, processed, distributed, and sold food.
Today, banks and other investors, as well as
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dedicated investment funds established as sub-
sidiaries of the ABCDs themselves, have invested
billions of dollars in food commodities with no
interest in taking possession of any physical com-
modity. Their behaviour is intimately linked to what
is happening in the physical trade of food, of course,
but it also affects that trade by affecting process and
behaviour (p. 6).
Therefore, whether it was purely financial actors going
agricultural or agricultural actors going financial, the
nature of the market that developed out of deregulation
led to a transformation of the agricultural system, which
can be broken into three categories: commodities, compa-
nies, and land. All three are interlinked, however for the
purposes of this paper the former two will be of central
focus here.
Agricultural commodities have long been linked to
speculation; however, the current extent of this speculation
is a new phenomenon. Agricultural commodity speculation,
simply put, involves betting on fluctuating prices. Today,
the intention is to maximize advantages with fluctuations in
the market. Traditionally, however, commodity speculation
was actually used as a protection for the agricultural sector.
Since the 19th century it was thought to enable commodity
traders and processors to protect themselves against short
term price volatility (Institute for Agriculture and Trade
Policy 2008). For commodity buyers and sellers, commer-
cial speculation has been a form of price insurance. This
started to change when markets were opened up due to the
aforementioned policy changes. It is argued that, as more
actors became drawn to agricultural markets, prices started
to become unstable. There are many types of speculation,
each with its own implications, some considered negative
and some positive. Table 1 outlines a useful categorization
proposed by Spratt (2013) on four main types of specula-
tion. This categorization helps to understand the different
uses and implications of speculation.
The fourth category—market speculation—is consid-
ered to be the most controversial form of speculation. With
this form of speculation, non-traditional speculators have
increasingly started participating in the derivatives markets
and ‘‘have been (re-)buying and (re-)selling all kinds of
derivative contracts with agricultural commodities and
derivative contracts as underlying assets’’ (Kerckhoffs
et al. 2010, p. 3), which is what some argue causes food
price volatility and possible food crises. In these cases, the
motivations are purely financial with little interest in the
implications of their investments or knowledge about the
underlying commodities they are speculating on (Spratt
2013). These actors include hedge funds, pension funds,
other institutional investors and large banks, often invest-
ment banks, operating as dealers (offering and entering into
derivative contracts).
The first category is the more traditional form of spec-
ulation, discussed earlier, which was used as a safeguard
for farmers. This is still used today and is provided as a risk
management tool by large agricultural firms and banks.
Cargill Risk Management could engage in all four types of
hedging depending on the client. For example, type 1
(Natural Independent Hedging) can be used for Cargill’s
smaller clients like large farm owners in North America,
while type 3 (Natural-Independent Speculation) and 4
Table 1 Spratt’s categorization of financial speculation
Type Explanation Impacts
(1) Natural-independent hedging This form of speculation is based on the need to
mitigate risk related to uncontrollable events, such
as weather
Is considered to have a positive consequence since it
allows for financial insurance in uncontrollable
situations, such as insuring one’s home against a
fire
(2) Market hedging This form of speculation is based on the need to
mitigate risk related to market movements
Impacts are ‘‘contingent upon the structure of the
market…’’ which is ‘‘…partly a result of policy




Actors engage in this form of speculation to ‘‘profit
from outcomes in the natural-independent hedging
market—e.g. weather-influenced securities or
insurance markets’’ (Spratt 2013, p. 7, emphasis
added)
Most negative impacts are restricted to the actor
taking the risk
(4) Market speculation Actors engage in this form of speculation in order to
make a profit from movements in the market they
are speculating on, such as agricultural commodity
markets
There are both positive and negative impacts.
Positive: providing liquidity and reducing hedging
costs. Negative: related to ‘‘potential amplification
of volatility and so the increased need to hedge




(Market Speculation) are provided as a service to larger
customers like pension funds.1 This will be discussed fur-
ther in the next section. What must be emphasized here is
how, as agriculture became financialized, traditional agri-
cultural players opened up their own funds and firms,
allowing them to engage in all the forms of speculation
listed above. These fundamentals likely encouraged tradi-
tional agricultural traders, such as Cargill, to open up
financial bodies allowing them to engage in market
speculation.
Agricultural companies are connected to financialization
in two primary ways: the first relates to larger agro-com-
modity traders opening financial arms and utilizing finan-
cial strategies to expand operations and the second relates
to acquiring equity in smaller agricultural companies for
the return on investment. Under this new financialized
agricultural model, traditional agro-commodity traders
began acting more like a bank rather than solely as an
agricultural trader. As Clapp explains, ‘‘[t]apping into ris-
ing investor demand for commodity derivative financial
products, the large agricultural commodity trading firms
also began to get into the business’’ (2014, p. 803). How-
ever, in many cases it is now difficult to tell the difference
between a financial actor and an agricultural one as, ‘‘[t]he
distinction between banks and commodity trading firms has
become increasingly blurred since the mid-1990s as both
sets of actors became actively engaged in selling OTC
agricultural commodity derivatives products such as com-
modity index funds and other OTC financial derivative
products’’ (Clapp 2014, p. 804). They have done so by
opening up different financial subsidiaries which in turn
invest in commodities, land, and agricultural companies.
Larger agricultural corporations, agro-commodity traders
especially, and financial institutions have started investing
in equity in smaller agricultural companies in an attempt to
gain control over agricultural production and supply
(Salerno 2014). For example, a private equity firm can
acquire stakes in a company using an established fund.
Once they have done so they can expand operations and
possible secure supply. This will be discussed further in the
next section with the case of Cargill.
The Cargill Platform and access to information
as a hedging strategy
The transformation and financialization of Cargill
Cargill was founded in 1865 in the US by William Cargill
and has remained in the family’s hands ever since. The
company has long since traded agro-commodities on the
market and was a member of the Chicago Board of Trade
since 1935. In the early years Cargill was involved mostly
as a trader—collecting, storing, and shipping grain and
other commodities around the US (Kneen 2002). The
company built grain elevators at important points along the
railways of Minnesota and Wisonconsin (ibid). Since then,
the company has been in constant transition—moving to
new regions when it became possible, diversifying the
commodities traded, reorganizing the company structure,
financializing its strategies, all while remaining privately
owned and controlled by the Cargill family. Cargill has
also consistently based its strategies on a network built on
the physical trade of commodities and the movement of
information. This information moves through a complex
web of networks comprising the Cargill Platform.
Today Cargill has operations controlled by various
branches and subsidiaries in 68 different countries. In
addition to this they also have many joint-ventures headed
by their subsidiaries. It has evolved into a global enterprise
composed of seven different business segments which are
subdivided further into business units and subunits. This
structure is what they call the Cargill Platform. It is made
up of: (1) Cargill agricultural supply chain (17 business
units—one being the palm oil company CTP Holdings)2;
(2) Cargill animal nutrition (two business units); (3) Cargill
animal protein and salt (13 business units); (4) Cargill
energy, transportation, and metals (five business, including
a shipping company, a petrochemical company, and more);
(5) Cargill financial services (two units, one being Cargill
Risk Management); (6) Cargill food and ingredients and
systems (26 units); and finally, (7) business units main-
tained but not associated with the Platform (including the
fund Black River Asset Management, Carval Investors, and
the land management agency, amongst others).3
Several of Cargill’s subsidiaries are now financial or are
in part connected to its financial operations. Three of the
most important financial subsidiaries include Black River
Asset Management, Cargill Risk Management, and Carval
Investors—each uses the company’s first-hand knowledge
of commodity markets and the Platform’s networks to
inform decisions on a range of financial instruments
including arbitrage, speculative trading, and equity posi-
tions.4 Black River Asset Management is an equity man-
agement firm working in company equity and index
products in food, agriculture, clean energy, and metals/
mining.5 Carval Investors works with distressed and credit
1 Interview with Cargill employee A, 18/10/2010.
2 Within this sector the commodities traded include: cotton, palm oil
and its derivatives, sugar, grain, oilseed. They also trade in meats,
cocoa in other subunits.
3 Outline provided by Cargill employee in an interview, 18/10/2010.
4 Interview with Cargill employee A, 18/10/2010.
5 Interview with Cargill employee A, 18/10/2010.
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intensive assets in loan portfolios, corporate securities, real
estate, and special opportunities. Cargill Risk Management
engages in market speculation on behalf of corporations
and financial bodies (such as funds), and engages in natural
independent hedging (type 1) for large farmers. Cargill’s
risk management firm invests in agricultural risk for cus-
tomers such as pension funds wanting to invest in agri-
expenses (type 3 and 4).6 They do so by focusing on when
and how to hedge using financial instruments to manage
exposure to risk through OTC swaps,7 exchange cleared
swaps, futures, and commodity linked notes in commodity
markets such as corn, wheat, soybean, vegetable oils,
livestock, etc.8 Cargill Risk Management and Black River
engage in both proprietary trading on behalf of Cargill as
well as providing financial strategies for customers.9
However, the amount that proprietary trading activities
contribute to Cargill’s profits and internal revenues is
beyond the scope of this paper. Each subsidiary contributes
to the various objectives of Cargill using diverse types of
financial strategies with different connections to agricul-
ture. Table 2 outlines the different forms of involvement in
agriculture of each subsidiary and the financial strategies
used.
Each of these financial subsidiaries represents an
important element of the financialization of Cargill’s
operations, and highlight just how important finance has
become for the company. The exact amount that each of
these firms contribute to Cargill’s profits is difficult to
discern and requires further analysis. However, Murphy
et al. suggest that a majority of profits come from their
financial activities, including ‘‘financial speculation on
agricultural commodity markets and index funds, trans-
portation, and storage’’ (2012, p. 11). In fact, since Cargill
began financializing its strategies, the company has not
only grown but has flourished (Murphy et al. 2012), leading
some to question whether financial activities are currently
even more important for profits than the trade of actual
commodities. For example, Lander notes that the argument
raised by Murphy et al. (2012) infers ‘‘access to informa-
tion about supply and demand, and the volatility of the
markets, especially early information, is more important to
the traders than the actual trading of commodities’’ (Lander
2016). Whether this is true or not is beyond the scope of
this paper, but it highlights the need for a more systematic
analysis of the role of each financial branch in the growth
and expansion of Cargill, and what this means for agro-
commodity markets.
Due to the operations and positioning of Cargill, via its
dominance over agricultural trade and its position with
suppliers and commodities, its operations were, and con-
tinue to be, highly attractive to investors who would like to
speculate on agricultural derivative markets. Cargill itself
is capitalizing on its position and has been amongst the
biggest winners of the large agro-commodity traders from
the transition. The corporate structure not only diversifies
its activities, it expands and deepens its knowledge making
it both the producer and supplier of agricultural com-
modities as well as the actor speculating on those same
commodities’ price fluctuations on agricultural markets.
Cargill’s Platform touches almost every element of agri-
cultural production and consumption globally. This pro-
vides the company with first-hand knowledge of
commodity markets which inform the company’s financial
strategies, including arbitrage, speculative trading, and
equity positions. The next section will address the com-
pany’s positioning and how this position is used to inform
speculative activities.
Table 2 Cargill’s privately held subsidiaries grouped by activities
Black river Carval investors Cargill risk management




Commodities Index products Hedging products (for corporations),
producers solutions (for capitalist
farmers), and products for clients (such
as pension funds)
Land Through agricultural company,
invests in land and production
Real estate investment
Info. On funds Approx. 15 funds in food,
agriculture, clean energy and
metals/mining
Asset classes: Loan Portfolios,
Corporate Securities, Real Estate
and Special Opportunities
Source: Author’s own elaboration
6 Interview with Cargill employee B, 18/10/2010.
7 A swap involves ‘the exchange of one asset or liability for a similar
asset or liability for the purpose of lengthening or shortening
maturities, or otherwise shifting risks’ (Irwin and Sanders 2010, p. 5).
8 Interview with Cargill employee B, 18/10/2010.
9 Interview with Cargill employee A and B, 18/10/2010.
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The ‘‘economic intelligence’’ of the Cargill Platform
Cargill’s economic intelligence is shaped by its Corporate
Platform, which ‘‘employs a large international network of
intelligence-gathering operatives, all plugged in electroni-
cally to the company’s French chateau-style headquarters
in the Minneapolis suburb of Minnetonka. Weather, crop,
price, currency, market, and political data pour in daily
from around the world for interpretation by Cargill traders
and managers’’ (Ahlberg 2014). Cargill has been employ-
ing a highly advanced information sharing technique since
around the 1920s, when the company implemented its
‘‘private teletype system, called ‘the wires’’’ which was
used ‘‘…to transmit intelligence to and from its far-flung
offices’’ (Davis 2009). Due to technological advances,
Cargill’s techniques on information gathering and sharing
have, of course, evolved tremendously. In fact, the former
U.S. Secretary of Agriculture, Bob Bergland, described the
company’s present-day ability to acquire political and
economic intelligence as exceeding that of the Central
Intelligence Agency (Ahlberg 2014).
Due to Cargill’s real-time insight into various markets
the company has been described as the ‘‘Goldman Sachs of
commodities trading’’ (Lippert 2011). These insights are
derived from information flowing through the Platform’s
networks, aiding Cargill’s sub branches to decide on ‘‘in-
vestment strategies on agricultural markets.’’10 These
investment strategies are derived from Cargill’s access to
privileged information regarding current and future supply,
demand, and risk, while also giving them an edge on future
price fluctuations through the Cargill network. The Plat-
form’s networks provide Cargill with a powerful market
position reaching various elements of the agricultural sys-
tem—they are not only commodity traders; they operate at
all levels of the commodity chain from ‘‘farm to plate’’. As
the company describes in a corporate brochure from 2001:
Cargill is an international marketer, processor and
distributor of agricultural, food, financial and indus-
trial products and services.
We are the flour in your bread, the wheat in your
noodles, the salt on your fries. We are the corn in
your tortillas, the chocolate in your dessert, the
sweetener in your soft drink. We are the oil in your
salad dressing and the beef, pork or chicken you eat
for dinner. We are the cotton in your clothing, the
backing on your carpet and the fertilizer in your field
(quoted in Kneen 2002).
In other words, Cargill is not simply a part of the chain,
‘‘they are the chain’’ (Lippert 2011). The Platform
constitutes a complex web of networks which connects
all of Cargill’s branches, subsidiaries, holdings, and
acquisitions. These networks provide Cargill access to on
the ground information around the world by connecting
their various branches, joint-venture partners, supplies,
customers, etc.
Information is therefore mainly shared through their
contacts on the ground working in, for, and with, the above
mentioned subsidiaries. In fact, according to van Dijk et al.
(2011), Cargill’s employees ‘‘count competitors’ trucks at
the gates of almost every cocoa warehouse in the port of
Abidjan in Ivory Coast to get a better picture of the size of
the country’s output’’ (p. 3). Therefore, local counterparts
track the operations of others and feed the information back
to the financial subsidiaries in Singapore and other finan-
cial hubs. Information also flows through Cargill’s World
Trading Unit in Geneva, where analysts track shipping
activities around the world, catalogue commodity move-
ments, and share information with other branches (Davis
2009).
This strategy forms the basis of how Cargill has used
financialization to expand its presence. The power of the
Cargill network for information gathering and how this
power is strengthened through the acquisition of national
companies is best examined through the case of Cargill’s
acquisition of the Australian Wheat Board (AWB) trading
and origination arm and GrainFlow storage and handling
business in 2011. AWB employs a network of 40 grain
marketers in 26 locations throughout Australia (ibid);
therefore, through the acquisition Cargill gained access to
information regarding the supply of grain throughout
Australia, allowing employees to process the information
through their networks and inform their hedging strategies.
Cargill is open about the significance of inside knowl-
edge to their success partly because it is a main attraction
for institutional investors. As they have explained,
‘‘[c]learly the volatility can be an opportunity’’ (Whitford
and Burke 2011); since Cargill knows how to prepare and
benefit from sharp price swings. This is not a natural
occurrence, but a result of business strategizing and
specific market positioning. In fact, Black River’s website
explains that ‘‘our strategies benefit from our extensive
worldwide footprint and decades of experience trading in
developing countries; and Black River commodity-related
strategies reflect our deep knowledge, and relationship to
our parent, Cargill’’ (Black River Asset Management
2014). Employees of Cargill have stated that the company
has a history of engaging in the stock market based on ‘‘the
knowledge of what is in short supply and what is not’’ since
‘‘this kind of information is very valuable for a hedge fund
because you know where to invest, when, and how
much.’’11
10 Interview with Cargill employee B, 18/10/2010. 11 Interview with Cargill employee B, 18/10/2010.
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The strong position of Cargill has attracted institutional
investors to Cargill’s financial branches. This is for various
reasons, first because of the strong fundamentals of agri-
cultural markets; second, because of the (sometimes) weak
fundamentals in other markets; third, because Cargill has
access to the relevant information needed to invest in these
markets; and fourth, although they are using insider
knowledge it cannot be considered insider trading because
of the structure of commodity futures markets.
The fourth attraction listed is very important, since
essentially it ensures that commodity traders are allowed to
maintain their superiority in agricultural markets. In short,
there is no legal barrier which hinders the sharing of
information to protect against insider trading in agricultural
commodity markets. Therefore, the very structure of
commodity markets is built in a way that benefits Cargill’s
hedging strategy by allowing for insider information
sharing while the structure of the Platform’s network is
what gives the company an edge over other speculators,
making them one of the best positioned to speculate on
agricultural markets. Black River Asset Management pro-
vides a useful example as to how Cargill has responded to
the design of futures markets to allow them to use infor-
mation to speculate.
Black River Asset Management
and the information network
Information pathways
From 1984 to 2003 Black River Asset management was
listed as Cargill’s Global Capital Markets Division with the
main function to engage in proprietary trade for Cargill.
Propriety trading involves trading in financial instruments
derived from the fund’s capital rather than that of cus-
tomers—using stocks, bonds, commodities, derivatives, and
currencies. Black River was initially established based on
Cargill’s business model and to make use of the knowledge
Cargill had regarding crop fluctuations (Salerno 2014). As
one employee stated, this information defined their hedging
strategy since it provided them privileged information
regarding ‘‘what kind of commodity to buy at what price’’
(Salerno 2014, p. 1719). In other words, Black River was
initially established with the main purpose to invest using
the information derived from other branches regarding crop
shortages and surpluses. Today, it engages in two key
mechanisms: (1) Absolute Return Trading Strategies, which
involves investing in financial instruments; and (2) Private
Equity Strategies, which consists of investing in companies.
Financing is derived from large financial investors such as
pension funds, endowments, and foundations, for whom it
manages over $4.5 billion USD in assets (ibid).
In 2008, when financial actors began gravitating towards
agriculture as a financial investment, Black River estab-
lished an Asian Food Fund, worth over $455 million USD.
This fund received capital from various institutional
investors including the Dutch Pension fund PGGM—
around €50 and €100 m (Alt Assets 2015)—and the
Teachers’ Retirement System of the State of Illinois—
around €60 m (Shieber 2013). This fund focused on the
equity acquisition of suppliers (or possible suppliers) of
Cargill, allowing Black River to invest in a company while
simultaneously investing in land and supply (Salerno
2014). The objective of the fund is to boost the output of
Cargill’s suppliers through capital input into a national
company from Black River to increase production.12
Interestingly, Cargill does not directly control land or run
on-farm operations in these arrangements. Rather it is
indirectly controlling production through the acquisition of
a company’s equity.13 This highlights the importance of
control over commodities and information regarding these
commodities for Cargill, rather than the land itself, dis-
cussed briefly below.
Black River often selects companies through the Plat-
form’s networks, composed of the network of each
employee and the companies that Cargill works with in
each national context.14 As one employee of Black River
described regarding selecting companies to acquire equity:
‘‘we use our Cargill network. Cargill has a lot of customers
in our sectors we are interested in.’’15 He also explains that
if they can’t find a company through formal contacts they
can also go ‘‘through friends too of course.’’16 Therefore,
Cargill first distinguishes its suppliers who are not able to
meet the demands of Cargill, and then has Black River
invest in the company to boost their output, and finally (in
most cases) the company in turn sells back the increased
supply to Cargill. As one employee explained,
For example, if they [Cargill business unit] are selling
to a shrimp feed company, but the company is not
able to grow enough for Cargill, mainly because it
can’t find enough funds, Cargill will approach us
[Black River] and tell us if we are interested to look
into this company. Then we help them to grow. Then
Cargill can get more product from them. So in this
situation it’s a win–win–win.17
12 Interview with Cargill employee B, 18/10/2010.
13 Cargill is directly involved in land control in its oil palm
operations, organised under Cargill Tropical Palm (CTP) Holdings.
14 Interview with Cargill employee B, 18/10/2010.
15 Interview with Cargill employee B, 18/10/2010.
16 Interview with Cargill employee B, 18/10/2010.
17 Interview with Cargill employee B, 18/10/2010.
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The investments act as a triple benefit for Cargill and Black
River: first, Cargill benefits from access to steady supply;
second, by acquiring a stake in this national company they
establish access to information; and third, Black River
financially benefits through the equity sale. By controlling
these companies through private equity Cargill gains
further access to inside knowledge regarding crop supply,
which provides them with information to speculate on. In
short, these investments establish sources of information on
the ground.
Even if it isn’t the company itself that has direct access
to the knowledge through a growth in operations, the actors
on the ground are able to follow the operations of other
companies nearby. Take the words of Jeff Drobny, chief
investment officer of Black River:
We have very unique visibility into a broad set of
commodities…genetics, the seeds that are being sold
to farmers, fertiliser, where it’s going and how much,
all the way through that partial and total supply chain
to when do they plan to harvest, where they plan to
sell, where is the origin of certain commodities, what
is the destination.
When we see something and have visibility into
something that the market is not focused on, there lies
the opportunity. It is important to emphasise how
unique our visibility to the fundamentals is, what we
do within that and how we capitalise on opportunities
(Lindsey 2013).
In other words, Black River has a window into various
commodity markets which allows them to act before
anyone else. Based on the information available to their
network and what is available to the actual market or to the
USDA, they can synthesize ‘‘what external market con-
sensus says, matching that with USDA forecasts’’ and then
comparing this to an internal analysis (Lindsey 2013). In
short, the strategy is to use, ‘‘cross-team collaboration, with
information gathered from across global networks and an
open dialogue to filter the best ideas, identify trends and
evaluate risks’’ (Lindsey 2013). In the words of Black
River:
We spend an enormous amount of time analysing the
fundamentals of the market, collecting data, watching
and discussing the cash markets and collaborating
with Cargill to understand the fundamentals for those
specific markets where we share information and
share points of view. We have access to a lot of
[Cargill’s] research with respect to those specific
money markets (Lindsey 2013).
It is one thing to have access to information, it is another to
have a network established which encourages the flow of
information to those that can use it for the benefit of
Cargill’s financial strategies. One way Cargill ensures
information makes it to the right actors is by providing
bonuses to employees. In a Wall Street Journal report,
Davis (2009) suggested that ‘‘the company adjusted its pay
system a few years ago to reward agribusiness units and
traders for advising each other about crop-disease out-
breaks or shifting demands of fast-food chains. Pay is
based partly on revenue generated by tips like these’’. This
infers that Cargill pays its employees from its various
subsidiaries in different countries around the world to share
the information on supply to its financial arms in order to
invest accordingly. The question then is how Black River
may be using the information passing through Cargill’s
networks to speculate.
The Black River strategy: manipulating the market
or simply profiting from uncertainty?
Within Cargill’s global network—composed of sub-
sidiaries, joint-venture partners, suppliers, clients, etc.—
information is constantly moving from sources on the
ground to speculators in financial offices, allowing them to
act before others through their inside edge. An example of
how information from Cargill’s structure and network is
used by Black River is ‘‘the perfect storm’’ of 2012. Black
River calls it ‘‘the perfect storm’’ because there were ‘‘crop
losses of enormous magnitude in all three major exporting
regions and countries in the world’’ (Lindsey 2013). In the
spring of 2012 the South American soya bean crop was
partially lost, then in the summer of 2012 the North
American corn, and later the European wheat crop (Lind-
sey 2013). Therefore, the most significant exporters of
grain and feed stuff in the world experienced problems
with crops simultaneously, leading to extreme price
movements. As an employee of Black River explained:
We perceived what was happening in the spring with
soya beans. We sensed that it was happening in corn
in the first part of June and we also picked up on the
fact that it was happening in Europe, also in the latter
part of June. The portfolio was positioned long all
three markets. We were long in our wheat, corn, and
soya beans (Lindsey 2013).
This implies that the company took a long position and
invested in the likelihood that the price would go up rather
than down, and in turn benefitted from it when prices acted
accordingly. The employee goes on to explain how this is
an example of how Black River’s ‘‘visibility’’ into national
contexts is important for their financial strategies: ‘‘We had
visibility through our knowledge of North American corn-
growing conditions from what we could perceive to be in
the field and on the ground and with what we knew had
already occurred in South America’’ (Lindsey 2013).
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Therefore, with knowledge regarding likely future com-
modity prices—derived from their onsite visibility—Black
River took the appropriate (long) position, and when the
crops mirrored their financial decisions they benefitted.
To summarize, the information regarding harvests is
acquired by Cargill daily from various sources on the
ground and channeled through the relevant businesses, then
analyzed by a team of financial analysts, and finally their
speculative positions can be made. Murphy et al. argue
accordingly that the ‘‘significant advantage’’ of agro-com-
modity traders regarding access to information, ‘‘makes
volatility important: they know better than most what
supply and demand are likely to be, and they make big
investments every year in financial markets, using this
knowledge to full effect. Volatile prices are good for
knowledgeable speculators’’ (2012, p. 12). In other words,
food price volatility can be beneficial for commodity tra-
ders. This is not to say that traders are causing price
volatility but that they are certainly benefitting from it.
Therefore, it is possible that access to information
regarding supply is as important, if not more so, than the
physical crop itself (Murphy et al. 2012). This would imply
that agro-commodity traders may be concerned less about
the traded commodity and more about the information
regarding the commodity. Whether or not this is true is
difficult to say, however it is clear that speculation has
become a vital element of the Cargill strategy that allows
them to continually grow and does so through the expan-
sion of its own Corporate Platform. Therefore, as the
company grows financially through its speculative activi-
ties it simultaneously expands its involvement in the agri-
cultural system. Therefore, Cargill itself may not be
directly causing food price volatility, but they are likely
benefitting from it via the financialization of the agricul-
tural system.
It is important to end with a note on how regulation has
been changing in recent years, which may impact Cargill’s
speculative activities. In 2013 the Dodd–Frank Act was
implemented in the US which aims to reform the US
financial sector. One regulation in Section 737 (4) of the
Act was proposed to ensure the CFTC (Commodity Futures
Trade Commission) establishes ‘‘limits on the amount of
positions, as appropriate, other than bona fide hedge posi-
tion, that may be held by any person with respect to con-
tracts of sale for future delivery or with respect to options
on the contracts or commodities traded on or subject to the
rules of a designated contract market’’ (United States
House of Representatives 2010).The intention of the limits
is to ‘‘diminish, eliminate, or prevent excessive specula-
tion’’, and to prevent market manipulation (United States
House of Representatives 2010). The regulation has yet to
be enacted and is still open for comment with the CFTC. It
has received pressure from the International Swaps and
Derivatives Association (ISDA) to weaken the legislation,
so it is yet to be seen if it will be implemented. However,
the Dodd–Frank Act has already had some implications for
Cargill, the biggest of which has been felt mainly by
Cargill Risk Management since they now have to register
as a swap dealer. One employee has explained that the
biggest impact has been on Cargill Risk Management’s
clients, since they must now also comply with the Dodd–
Frank rules as well making them hesitant to expose
themselves.18 This is connected to older policy—discussed
previously—that manages swap activities. Since Cargill
Risk Management must now register as a swap dealer due
to the Dodd–Frank Act, these previous policies now apply
to Cargill as well. However, the position limits rule of the
Dodd–Frank Act has yet to be enacted and if the rule goes
through, the position limits might change further. Black
River, on the other hand, has apparently not been impacted
by the regulation due to the structure of their funds, which
exempts them from registering.19 While the Dodd–Frank
Act establishes limits and has hindered some of Cargill
Risk Management’s activities, it does not influence the way
information is shared between Cargill’s networks, meaning
they may still maintain an edge over other actors regardless
of the regulation.
Conclusion
This paper has argued that Cargill is able to both benefit
from, and engage in, speculation through the company’s
corporate structure and privileged access to information
regarding supply. Cargill’s operations were presented to
analyze how they have financialized their strategies by
opening up various financial braches and how their con-
nections on the ground feed information to the financial
arms to inform hedging strategies. The case of Black River
depicts how the network of Cargill allows them to expand
their involvement in the agricultural system and capitalize
on their knowledge and experience to exploit commodity
markets to secure profits for themselves beyond simple
hedging. It was argued that, although Cargill is using inside
knowledge to speculate, it is not considered insider trading,
making their activities legal and unregulated. This is due to
the very structure of commodity markets, making Cargill’s
activities an opportunistic response to the way different
markets have been designed. Therefore, for Cargill it is
likely that speculation has been a resourceful response to
the financialization of agriculture and their strategic
18 Correspondence with Cargill employee. Date not provided to
protect identity of the employee.
19 Correspondence with Cargill employee. Date not provided to
protect identity of the employee.
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positioning at the crossroads of the agricultural system. The
position and involvement of Cargill and Black River in
agricultural speculation shows how Cargill is essentially
behaving like a financial firm while utilizing their unique
positioning in the agricultural system and exploiting the
opportunities made possible by agriculture’s ‘financialisa-
tion in reverse’ (Burch and Lawrence 2009, p. 276).
This paper has undergone a preliminary discussion of this
‘financialization in reverse’, with respect to the role of
agricultural traders in speculation. Future research should be
undertaken to delve deeper into the debate to address whe-
ther agricultural traders do in fact influence,manipulate, and/
or control agricultural markets and food prices. Clearly, as
more and more financial actors sell off their commodity
branches, traders are taking a more centralized role in the
financialization of agriculture. However, this cannot be
clarified without a more thorough analysis of commodity
markets and the actors dominating them. To further expose
these dynamics it is important to analyze the level and extent
of the financialization of traders, such asCargill, andwhether
the profits from financial activities have surpassed that of
trading activities. This would help clarify whether Murphy
et al. (2012) are right to hypothesize that in the current
financialized agricultural system, the information itself is
more lucrative than the actual trading of commodities.
The debate would also benefit from an extensive quan-
titative analysis on the financial operations of agro-com-
modity traders. Future research into different financial
activities of Cargill alone could reveal important infor-
mation on speculating in agricultural commodity markets.
For example, the different types of hedging used by Car-
gill’s branches, the share of these branches in commodity
hedging for certain crops, and the implications of each,
could shed light on the level and type of influence of
Cargill’s operations on commodity markets. To make the
analysis more intricate it could also be revealing to dis-
tinguish the level (and type) of proprietary trading versus
trading on behalf of clients in each firm’s financial branch.
However, acquiring most of this data can be very dif-
ficult, especially with privately listed firms. One solution is
to undergo a comparative analysis of different cases of
publically listed agro-commodity traders, such as ADM.
Since publically listed traders are required to share a cer-
tain level of information regarding their different activities
and operations, this could address gaps in the research on
Cargill in particular. Researching agro-commodity traders
and the financialization of agriculture can be very difficult
due to barriers in access to information. However, all of
these aforementioned possible research paths are crucial to
explore in order to gain more insight into the changing
scope of the agricultural system, the possible impact on
food prices, and the place of agro-commodity traders in all
of this.
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